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IRAN SANCTIONS: A COMPLIANCE PERSPECTIVE
THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENTERING THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
Talib Amir*
ABSTRACT
U.S. sanctions against Iran have limited trade between foreign and
Iranian companies for decades. The 2015 nuclear agreement eased
sanctions by widening the scope of permitted business dealings, but
brought attendant risks to foreign companies considering venturing
into Iran. This Essay proposes that companies can employ a riskreward model to assess whether the opportunity posed by a proposed
venture justifies the risks of violating sanctions laws. The Essay
suggests that companies can create a model by categorizing and
quantifying the likely benefits of a business deal and compare the
opportunity with risks, after implementing processes to limit specific
risks. The Essay draws upon relevant sanctions laws and the history
of violations to highlight some of the pitfalls that corporations and
financial institutions may encounter under the recent loosening of
sanctions.
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INTRODUCTION
The Iran nuclear deal may by this point be resting on solid political
ground, or it may be floundering in quicksand. For compliance officers
entrusted with assessing the risks of doing business with the Islamic
Republic, the volatility of the situation poses special challenges. The
Obama administration announced the Iran deal with great fanfare in July
2015,1 possibly heralding a new era of greater openness. President Barack
1. Wash. Post Staff, Full Text: Obama’s News Conference on the Iran Nuclear
Deal, WASH. POST (July 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2015/07/15/transcript-obamas-news-conference-on-the-iran-nucleardeal/?utm_term=.d422a4a9da06 [https://perma.cc/P9EE-2U3S].
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Obama said the agreement was a “once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to see
whether or not we can at least take the nuclear issue off the table.”2 But
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), negotiated between
Iran on the one hand and the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and
China on the other,3 has encountered grave problems since Donald Trump
won the U.S. election. President Trump has been a staunch opponent of
the agreement, 4 putting its future in doubt. The administration’s
opposition, however, is countered by the Europeans and Iranians stating
their commitment to the deal. 5 Moreover, a future Democratic
administration could well continue with the diplomatic rapprochement
that President Obama began.
The role of compliance officers who are responsible for assessing
business risks in Iran takes on added urgency in this politically shifting
environment. Compliance departments are by their nature adept at
managing risks, and Iran sanctions laws—while particularly
challenging—should not be an insurmountable hurdle to a credible risk
assessment. This Essay seeks to present the Iran nuclear deal as an issue
that can be analyzed in a risk-reward framework from a corporate
compliance viewpoint. Similar frameworks may be familiar to
compliance officers, risk managers, and ultimately, the corporation’s
executives and directors. To be clear, this Essay does not espouse a
particular political stance, nor can it predict where the deal will stand after
all parties to the agreement have had their final word. This Essay
delineates the regulatory opening that was afforded to some companies
by the relaxation of sanctions, how those companies saw a business
opportunity, and what the risks are to companies and financial institutions
doing business with Iran if the deal ultimately collapses.

2. Thomas L. Friedman, Iran and the Obama Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/opinion/thomas-friedman-the-obama-doctrineand-iran-interview.html [https://perma.cc/V4P2-U6JX].
3. Kelsey Davenport, EU Prepares for U.S. Exit From Iran Deal: Trump’s Threat
to Walk Away Rattles Key Allies, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (Apr. 2018),
https://www.armscontrol.org/taxonomy/term/10 [https://perma.cc/4WFM-GMWP].
4. Katie Bo Williams & Rebecca Kheel, Iran Deal Faces Uncertain Future Under
Trump, HILL (July 18, 2017, 5:02 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/nationalsecurity/342594-iran-deal-faces-uncertain-future-under-trump [https://perma.cc/KXG8Z32L].
5. Laura Smith-Spark, US Allies in Europe Vow to Stand by Iran Nuclear Deal,
CNN (Oct. 14, 2017, 8:22 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/14/world/iran-trumpworld-reaction/index.html [https://perma.cc/7ESL-VK5Z].
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This Essay proposes that companies assessing risk in the Iran market
create an overarching matrix for identifying risk compared with a sideby-side analysis of economic rewards. Seen from a macro level, the
economic rewards of doing business with Iran can be weighed against risk
holistically and serve as an effective tool to aid senior management in
arriving at a final determination. Moreover, an early assessment of risk
and reward can enhance the partnership between a company’s compliance
and business departments by developing risk controls—historically, a
compliance function—alongside sales and marketing. Since the
departments will agree to the risk categories prior to engaging in business
deals with Iran, the risk-reward matrix will show the method used to
determine whether the hazards of conducting business in Iran outweigh
the potential benefits.
I. THE OPENING OF IRANIAN MARKETS
A. SANCTIONS TIMELINE
This section describes the complex history of U.S. sanctions rules,
highlighting the relevant laws applicable to banking and corporate
compliance. The U.S. government first imposed sanctions on Iran after
the hostage crisis in 1979.6 Those sanctions were removed in 1981, but
were reimposed in 1987 after the U.S. found that Iran supported
international terrorism. 7 The current sanctions regime results from the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
passed by Congress in 2010.8 The law prohibits the export of goods or
services to Iran or another country knowing the intended recipient is the
Islamic Republic.9 The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets

6. KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS
(2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf [https://perma.cc/LK89-V3XJ].
7. Id.
8. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-194, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010) (codified at 22 U.S.C. 8501 (2012)).
9. Josh Levs, A Summary of Sanctions Against Iran, CNN (Jan. 23, 2012, 2:13 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/23/world/meast/iran-sanctions-facts/index.html
[https://perma.cc/D3HM-ZZ8S].
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Control (OFAC) has jurisdiction over the Iran sanctions rules.10 In a 2011
memo, then Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner noted Iran’s support
for terrorist financing and money laundering and advocated for the
international financial sector to sever ties with the Islamic Republic.11
Treasury rules echoed similar actions by the U.K. and Canada. 12 To
support the move, Mr. Geithner said the intergovernmental Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) had identified the risk to the international
financial system emanating from Iran. The Geithner memo stated that the
FATF had brought attention to the Iranian central bank’s role in financing
terrorism and money-laundering activities around the world. 13 Any
individual violating the sanctions would be subject to civil penalties of up
to $250,000 or twice the transaction value, and criminal penalties for
willful violations of up to $1 million and twenty years in prison. 14
Financial institutions were subject to civil penalties of up $250,000 or
twice the transaction value. 15 The Treasury said it could impose strict
conditions on the opening or maintaining in the U.S. of correspondent
accounts or payable-through accounts for a foreign financial institution.16
The 2011 directive was the most sweeping U.S. action against the Iranian
banking sector, but it was not the only one. In 2007, the U.S. prohibited
dealings with Iranian governmental organizations, including the IRGC
based on its association with terrorism.17
10. About, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizationalstructure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Foreign-Assets-Control.aspx [https://perma.cc/22VGNP5F] (last visited Mar. 31, 2018).
11. David S. Cohen, Treasury Notes: The Entire Iranian Banking Sector, U.S. DEP’T
TREASURY (Nov. 22, 2011), https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/The-EntireIranian-Banking-Sector.aspx [https://perma.cc/6VVQ-S6BC].
12. Richard Solash, U.S., U.K., Canada Hit Iran With New Economic Sanctions,
RADIOFREEEUROPE RADIOLIBERTY (Nov. 22, 2011, 8:24 AM), https://www.rferl.org/a/
uk_cuts_all_financial_ties_with_iran_banks/24397756.html [https://perma.cc/67HT-F6
MS].
13. Cohen, supra note 11.
14. OFAC FAQs: Iran Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_iran.aspx#cisada [https://perma.cc/ZTV7-WC
JH] (last updated Feb. 20, 2018, 5:44 PM).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Designation of Iranian
Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism (Oct. 25,
2007), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp644.aspx[https://
perma.cc/2M3Q-L2KH].
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On August 2, 2017, President Trump signed into law additional
sanctions targeting Iran in addition to Russia and North Korea. 18
Specifically, the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions
Act, which took effect in October, toughened existing sanctions on the
IRGC and individuals associated with it.19 The nuclear pact states that
sanctions will not be applied retroactively to existing contracts between
Iran and other parties, but a gray area exists on the timing of any winddown period.20 Therefore, companies seeking to do business with Iran
need to be aware of sanctions against entities like the IRGC and its
affiliates. This may be easier said than done, considering the wide reach
of the organization in Iran and its central role in protecting the principles
of the 1979 revolution.21 Dr. Emanuele Ottolenghi, a senior fellow at the
Foundation for Defense of Democracies, has studied Iran sanctions and
the IRGC’s pervasive influence in Iranian society.22 In testimony before
a House subcommittee in September 2015, Dr. Ottolenghi listed Iran’s
defense, aviation, oil, and shipping sectors, among others, as having
heavy IRGC influence.23 The nuclear pact strengthens the IRGC since
foreign corporations accept companies owned or controlled by the group
as legitimate business partners, according to Dr.Ottolenghi. 24 Thus, a
multinational firm conducting business with an Iranian company in which
18. Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 115-44
(2017).
19. Id.
20. The Challenges of the U.S. and EU Divergence on Iranian Sanctions, ALLEN &
OVERY (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Thechallenges-of-the-U-S—and-EU-divergence-on-Iranian-sanctions.aspx [https://perma.cc
/U7EY-YRZA].
21. Anthony Rapa, The IRGC and the Challenges of Entering the Iranian Market,
Part 1, STEPTOE: INT’L COMPLIANCE BLOG (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.steptoe
internationalcomplianceblog.com/2015/10/the-irgc-and-the-challenges-of-entering-theiranian-market-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/P6FX-C2W7].
22. Our Team: Dr. Emanuele Ottolenghi, FOUND. FOR DEF. DEMOCRACIES,
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/about-fdd/team-overview/emanuele-ottolenghi/
[https://perma.cc/N52E-3T73] (last visited Mar. 31, 2018).
23. The Iran Nuclear Deal and Its Impact on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Middle E. & N. Afr. of the H. Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of Dr. Emanuele Ottolenghi, Foundation for the
Defense of Democracies).
24. Id. at 1 (“The IRGC and the supreme leader’s business interests are active in
many sectors—some of which they dominate almost completely. IRGC companies will
get the lion’s share of public contracts and business opportunities.”).
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the IRGC or another sanctioned entity holds a stake may be held liable
for violating U.S. sanctions laws. 25 OFAC issues a list of sanctioned
individuals and entities, which includes the IRGC and individuals
associated with it.26 The extensive list of what the Treasury Department
refers to as “Specially Designated Nationals,” or SDNs, is updated
frequently.27 Corporate compliance offers should note that the rationale
behind sanctions in general is largely political, in which the U.S. seeks to
advance foreign-policy objectives.28 Any corporation doing business with
Iran would assume liabilities by running afoul of “snapped back,” or
reimposed sanctions if it did not wind down Iran-related business
operations within the guidelines established by the Treasury
Department.29 While the original policy enacted by President Obama has
changed due to the shift in political stance taken by the Trump
administration, it should be noted that many of the largest sanctions
violations penalties were levied during the Obama administration.30 As
one law firm noted, “[w]hile the size of corporate penalties may be
impacted under a Trump Administration, we do not foresee a significant
shift in terms of overall sanctions/[anti-money laundering]
enforcement.”31

25. Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Lifting of Certain U.S. Sanctions
Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Implementation Day, U.S.
DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Docu
ments/jcpoa_faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/953B-X3DC] (last updated Dec. 15, 2016).
26. Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN) Human
Readable Lists, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/WZ84-2M26].
27. OFAC FAQs: Sanctions Lists and Files, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_lists.aspx [https://
perma.cc/NLZ5-L8JW] (last updated Apr. 18, 2017, 6:13 PM).
28. Richard N. Haass, Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing, BROOKINGS
(June 1, 1998), https://www.brookings.edu/research/economic-sanctions-too-much-of-abad-thing/ [https://perma.cc/XQ6M-XBYF].
29. Steven F. Hill et al., OFAC Provides Prospective Guidance on Potential “SnapBack” of Iran Sanctions, K&L GATES (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.klgates.com/ofacprovides-prospective-guidance-on-potential-snap-back-of-iran-sanctions-12-21-2016/
[https://perma.cc/CBP8-JBRD].
30. The Regulatory and Enforcement Outlook for Financial Institutions in 2017:
Trends in Sanctions, Anti-Money Laundering and Cybersecurity, PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.paulweiss.com/media/39672
32/22feb17aml.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5ZX-WQW9].
31. Id.
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B. SANCTIONS EASING
In 2015, Iran and six world powers, including the U.S., reached an
agreement to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program would be exclusively
peaceful. 32 The agreement calls for the relaxation of international
sanctions against the Islamic Republic beginning in January 2016 in
return for Iran “verifiably meeting its nuclear commitments.”33 Sanctions
were eased across a number of sectors, including, oil and natural gas,
aviation, and shipping.34 Indeed, many global companies saw their chance
to invest in a country that was largely isolated from the world economy
and needed to upgrade its industry.35 For example, Boeing agreed to sell
80 aircraft to the national carrier, Iran Air.36 Boeing’s European rival,
Airbus, reached a similar deal to deliver 100 airplanes to Iran Air37 after
the U.S. government granted Boeing and Airbus licenses to sell
commercial airliners in September 2016. 38 Officials estimate that Iran
will likely need upwards of 400 commercial planes in the next decade to
replace its aging fleet.39
32. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://
www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ [https://perma.cc/GHP5-CNJ9] (last visited Mar.
31, 2018).
33. Id.
34. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, Iran Sanctions Relief Implemented,
LEXOLOGY (Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f9d3cedac3b1-4eed-ac08-dbb0cc5775f7 [https://perma.cc/BA8K-NBYF].
35. Majid Rafizadeh, Doing Business With Post-Sanctions Iran: Risks and
Opportunities, HUFFINGTON POST, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/majid-rafizadeh/
doing-business-with-post_b_7960484.html [https://perma.cc/HFX4-2E9K] (last visited
Mar. 31, 2018).
36. Jeff Daniels, Boeing’s $8 Billion Deal on Sale of 80 Aircraft to Iran Air Still Safe
— At Least for Now, CNBC (Oct. 13, 2017, 4:34 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/
10/13/boeings-8-billion-aircraft-sale-to-iran-air-still-safe-for-now.html
[https://perma.cc/P9UZ-J8TN].
37. Tim Hepher, Iran Jetliner Deal Could Take Longer to Complete, Airbus Says,
REUTERS (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-airbus-orders-iran/iranjetliner-deal-could-take-longer-to-complete-airbus-says-idUSKBN1F42B1
[https://perma.cc/C4YX-75NX].
38. Thomas Erdbrink & Nicola Clark, U.S. Allows Boeing and Airbus to Sell Planes
to Iran, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/wor
ld/middleeast/iran-airbus-boeing-aircraft.html [https://perma.cc/RG9Q-5HJQ].
39. Tim Hepher & Conor Humphries, Aviation Giants Tread Carefully in Test Case
for Post-Sanctions Iran, REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2016, 3:52 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
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Similarly, oil companies have taken advantage of the “opening.”
Anglo-Dutch oil company, Royal Dutch Shell, signed a deal in December
2016 with Iran’s state-oil company to explore future projects.40 In July
2017, French oil company, Total, said it would invest $1 billion to
develop an Iranian gas field.41 The Total deal is notable because a Chinese
bank signed up to provide the financing; many Western banks have shied
away from doing business in Iran.42
C. SANCTIONS EASING ON BANKS
Existing sanctions rules still apply to U.S. banks, limiting their
access to the Iranian market. 43 The primary effect of sanctions easing
applies to foreign financial institutions.44 Under the rules, non-U.S. banks
are permitted to do business with an Iranian bank if the transactions are
tied to civilian uses, energy, or trade finance, and the bank is not tied to
terror groups, criminals, or weapons.45 The sanctions relaxation allows
foreign banks to engage in Iran-related trade and financing deals without
fear of violating U.S. law. 46 In 2016, the Treasury issued updated
guidelines that stressed the prohibition of U.S. employees from Iran-

article/us-iran-aviation-insight/aviation-giants-tread-carefully-in-test-case-for-post-san
ctions-iran-idUSKCN0V00R4 [https://perma.cc/Q8EJ-QNCT].
40. Benoit Faucon & Sarah Kent, Shell Signs Preliminary Iran Oil Deal Despite
Uncertainty Over Trump, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 7, 2016, 3:34 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-says-shell-to-agree-to-develop-oil-field-1481099100
[https://perma.cc/9855-WH3J].
41. Sarah Kent & Benoit Faucon, France’s Total Set to Invest $1 Billion in Giant
Iranian Gas Field, WALL STREET J. (July 2, 2017, 9:03 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/frances-total-set-to-invest-1-billion-in-giant-iranian-gas-field-1499000613
[https://perma.cc/K7KR-VH5A].
42. Factbox – Iran’s Deals With Foreign Firms Since Easing of Sanctions, REUTERS
(Oct. 15, 2017, 6:07 AM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-nuclear-economy-dealsfactbox/factbox-irans-deals-with-foreign-firms-since-easing-of-sanctions-idUKKBN1C
K0CZ [https://perma.cc/K22T-HBK9].
43. OFAC FAQs: Iran Sanctions, supra note 14.
44. Id.
45. Brian Monroe, In Iran Nuclear Deal, Compliance Challenges Rise When
‘Secondary Sanctions’ on Banks Fail, ASS’N CERTIFIED FIN. CRIME SPECIALISTS (Apr.
16, 2015), https://www.acfcs.org/news/300891/In-Iran-nuclear-deal-compliance-chall
enges-rise-when-secondary-sanctions-on-banks-fall.htm [https://perma.cc/6EC8-TS4G].
46. Id.
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related business at a foreign bank.47 Americans “must be walled off or
‘ring-fenced’ from Iran-related business,” the Treasury guidelines said.48
For example, under the eased sanctions, General License H permits nonU.S. subsidiaries of U.S. enterprises to trade with Iranian banks and
businesses. 49 The license authorizes non-U.S. companies owned or
controlled by U.S. persons to do business with Iran, subject to
conditions.50
The updated sanctions rules offer an opportunity to European banks
to conduct business in Iran, and permit Iranian financial institutions to
open branches in Europe. 51 The rules include provisions prohibiting
dollar-based processing of any payments that are linked to Iranian
transactions.52 Foreign banks are prohibited from “rout[ing] transactions
involving Iran . . . through the U.S. financial system, or involv[ing] U.S.
persons in such transactions.”53
Furthermore, U.S. financial institutions and foreign banks with U.S.
operations may not do business with Iranian individuals or entities that
are on sanctions lists, including those that have been designated as having
ties to terrorism.54 For example, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
is on the terrorism sanctions list and also has ties to Iranian state
enterprises, which subjects any foreign bank doing business with such an

47. Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Lifting of Certain U.S. Sanctions
Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Implementation Day, supra
note 25.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Mamta Borkar, In an Effort to Play by International Rules, Iranian Banks Take
Dutch
Compliance
Course,
SANCTIONSALERT.COM
(Sept.
26,
2016),
http://sanctionsalert.com/in-an-effort-toplay-by-international-rules-iranian-banks-takedutch-compliance-course/ [https://perma.cc/4HFP-H9GY].
52. Arne Mielken, Six Compliance Lessons From the Iran Nuclear Sanctions Deal,
COMPLIANCE WK. (July 28, 2016), https://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/globalglimpses/six-compliance-lessons-from-the-iran-nuclear-sanctionsdeal#.WUVPJjPMy_s [https://perma.cc/BX7W-AUUN].
53. Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Lifting of Certain U.S. Sanctions
Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Implementation Day, supra
note 25.
54. Id.
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enterprise to penalties for sanctions violations. 55 Therefore, global
financial institutions can conduct business with certain Iranian
enterprises, provided they have robust controls in place to comply with
Treasury guidelines.56
D. TENTATIVE BUSINESS TIES WITH IRAN
U.S. actions and rhetoric have chilled the atmosphere but not frozen
ties between Iran and the rest of the world. In the past year, trade between
Iran and the E.U. has increased, and Germany and other European
countries have explored further strengthening ties.57 To test the waters,
German economic minister Sigmar Gabriel went to Iran in October 2016
and stated that “‘many thousand[s] of jobs in our country’” rely on
Germany being active and successful abroad. 58 More to the point, he
stressed that the country does not want to waste the opportunity presented
by the relaxation of the Iran nuclear sanctions. 59 German engineering
company, Siemens AG, also took advantage of the opening by agreeing
to jointly manufacture locomotives and supply equipment to Iran’s
transportation sector.60

55. Treasury Gives New Guidance, But Banks Still Wary, IRAN WATCH (June 10,
2016),
http://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/policy-briefs/treasury-gives-newguidance-banks-still-wary [https://perma.cc/DZ9T-U99Z].
56. Sanctions on Iran Lifted - But Not for Most U.S. Companies, BARNES &
THORNBURG LLP (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.btlaw.com/International-Trade-LawAlert—Sanctions-on-Iran-Lifted—But-Not-for-Most-US-Companies-01-20-2016/
[https://perma.cc/VB7G-27AZ].
57. Iran-EU Trade Doubles, FIN. TRIB. (Nov. 2, 2017), https://financialtribune.com/
articles/economy-domestic-economy/75418/iran-eu-trade-doubles
[https://perma.cc/SZK7-SHLE].
58. Daniel Mützel, German-led ‘Scramble for Iran’ Under Way, Slowed by Fearful
Banks, EURACTIV (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/
news/german-led-scramble-for-iran-underway-slowed-by-fearful-banks/ [https://perma.
cc/8KYS-5GYU].
59. Id.
60. Iran, Germany Sign 6 Transport MOUs, IRAN INT’L (Jan. 2017),
http://www.iraninternationalmagazine.com/issue_82/text82/iran,%20germany%20sign
%206%20transport%20mous.htm [https://perma.cc/3JFA-77HY].
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II. HISTORICAL SANCTIONS
A. SANCTIONS RUNNING: FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
This section recounts the history of sanctions violations and the
lessons that can be learned in designing a risk-based compliance model
for conducting business in Iran. Deutsche Bank was among several
institutions that ran afoul of U.S. sanctions laws and paid a $258 million
fine to regulators in November 2015.61 The fines settled charges that it
conducted nearly $10.9 billion worth of dollar-clearing transactions from
1999 through 2006. 62 The bank disguised 27,200 transactions with
Iranian, Libyan, Burmese, Syrian, and Sudanese entities—all on the U.S.
sanctions list.63 The Federal Reserve said at the time that Deutsche Bank
did not have the policies and procedures in place to effectively monitor
sanctions compliance in offices outside of the U.S. 64 Deutsche Bank
recognized the shortcomings, agreed to install an independent monitor,
and fired six employees involved with the violations.65 Regulators said
those employees developed several processes to handle dollar payments
in ways that circumvented controls designed to detect problematic
payments.66 One method was wire-stripping, or changing the information
included on the payment message. 67 Bank staff in overseas offices
removed payment information linking it to an Iranian sanctioned entity

61. Frances Coppola, Deutsche Bank’s Fine For Breaking Sanctions Is By No Means
Its Biggest Problem, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2015, 7:34 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/francescoppola/2015/11/07/deutsche-banks-recent-fine-for-breaking-sanctions-isby-no-means-its-biggest-problem/#16ab42fb2bfa [https://perma.cc/7DPP-DTRN].
62. Christopher M. Matthews, Deutsche Bank to Pay $258 Million in Fines for
Violating U.S. Sanctions, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
deutsche-bank-to-pay-258-million-in-fines-for-violating-u-s-sanctions-1446661556
[https://perma.cc/JH2E-NF4Q].
63. Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., NYDFS Announces Deutsche Bank to
Pay $258 Million, Install Independent Monitor, Terminate Employees for Transactions
on Behalf of Iran, Syria, Sudan, Other Sanctioned Entities (Nov. 4, 2015),
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1511041.htm [https://perma.cc/J547-FUR8].
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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before the payment was passed along to the correspondent bank in the
U.S.68
Other banks were also fined for violating U.S. sanctions. BNP
Paribas stands out for the hefty $8.9 billion penalty levied against it in
June 2014. 69 U.S. regulators charged the French bank with breaking
sanctions against Sudan, Iran, and Cuba.70 Further, in 2012, HSBC agreed
to pay $1.9 billion in fines.71 Commerzbank agreed to pay $1.45 billion
in penalties in March 2015,72 and Credit Agricole was fined $787 million
in October of that year. 73 Barclays was levied a $298 million fine in
August 2010, and RBS had to pay a $100 million fine for breaking
sanctions against Iran, Sudan, Myanmar, and Cuba in 2013.74 Standard
Chartered faced multiple violations over the years, agreeing to pay fines
totaling nearly $1 billion for failing to comply with sanctions laws. 75
Additionally, regulators required Barclays, 76 BNP Paribas, 77 Deutsche

68. Id.
69. Danielle Douglas, France’s BNP Paribas to Pay $8.9 Billion to U.S. for
Sanctions Violations, WASH. POST (June 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/frances-bnp-paribas-to-pay-89-billion-to-us-for-money-laundering/2
014/06/30/6d99d174-fc76-11e3-b1f4-8e77c632c07b_story.html?utm_term=.c76a22847
296 [https://perma.cc/5HWY-VGSC].
70. Id.
71. Aruna Viswanatha & Brett Wolf, HSBC to Pay $1.9 Billion U.S. Fine in MoneyLaundering Case, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2012, 12:45 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-hsbc-probe/hsbc-to-pay-1-9-billion-u-s-fine-in-money-laundering-case-idUSBRE8B
A05M20121211 [https://perma.cc/MU3K-NWLF].
72. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Commerzbank AG Admits to Sanctions and
Bank Secrecy Violations, Agrees to Forfeit $563 Million and Pay $79 Million Fine (Mar.
12, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/commerzbank-ag-admits-sanctions-and-banksecrecy-violations-agrees-forfeit-563-million-and [https://perma.cc/F3C8-R2U3].
73. Ben Protess & Chad Bray, Crédit Agricole to Pay $787 Million for Sanctions
Violations, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
10/21/business/dealbook/credit-agricole-to-pay-787-million-for-sanctions-violations.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/43BN-E6FP].
74. Coppola, supra note 61.
75. Cynthia O’Murchu et al., Standard Chartered: The Iranian Connection, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/2b174d9c-5c81-11e5-9846de406ccb37f2 [https://perma.cc/92WT-3JXD].
76. Mario Mancuso et al., Lessons Learned From Recent OFAC Enforcement Cases,
3 FIN. FRAUD L. REP. 640 (2011).
77. Michelle S. Carino, BNP Paribas Joins the Bank Perp Walk, POMERANTZ LLP
(July/Aug. 2014), http://pomerantzlawfirm.com/publications/2015/6/22/bnp-paribasjoins-the-bank-perp-walk [https://perma.cc/VAS5-VQ44].
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Bank, 78 Commerzbank, 79 Credit Agricole, 80 HSBC, 81 and Standard
Chartered82 to appoint independent monitors as part of their settlement
agreements. In many cases, regulators found that the violations were not
isolated incidents occurring in a small office, but actions that spanned
many years and involved employees at senior levels. 83 In the case of
Deutsche, staff handbooks instructed employees to conceal payments
involving sanctioned countries or institutions. 84 Deutsche Bank ended
business dealings with Iran in 2007 under pressure from U.S. sanctions
laws.85 The bank said it was cutting ties because the effort of maintaining
Iranian accounts did not justify the returns.86 Iranian business made up
only 0.1% of turnover, according to Deutsche statements at the time.87

78. Deutsche Bank Fined $258m for Violating US Sanctions, GUARDIAN (Nov. 4,
2015, 1:51 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/nov/04/deutsche-bank-ussanctions-fine [https://perma.cc/YH6N-VAAW].
79. Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., NYDFS Announces Commerzbank to
Pay $1.45 Billion, Terminate Employees, Install Independent Monitor for Banking Law
Violations (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1503121.htm
[https://perma.cc/5GXH-JBZA].
80. Karen Freifeld, Credit Agricole to Pay $787 Million to Resolve U.S. Sanctions
Probe, REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2015, 8:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-creditagricole-probe/credit-agricole-to-pay-787-million-to-resolve-u-s-sanctions-probeidUSKCN0SD2J820151020 [https://perma.cc/3GXP-5ARX].
81. Aruna Viswanatha & Brett Wolf, HSBC to Pay $1.9 Billion U.S. Fine in MoneyLaundering Case, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2012, 12:45 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-hsbc-probe/hsbc-to-pay-1-9-billion-u-s-fine-in-money-laundering-case-idUSBRE8B
A05M20121211 [https://perma.cc/2RJM-S9SH].
82. Lawrence White & Suzanne Barlyn, StanChart Faces Extension of U.S. MoneyLaundering Vigilance, REUTERS (Sept. 2, 2016, 11:40 AM), https://uk.reuters.com/art
icle/uk-hsbc-stanchart-compliance/stanchart-faces-extension-of-u-s-money-launderingvigilance-idUKKCN118223 [https://perma.cc/C4KW-62LX].
83. O’Murchu et al., supra note 75.
84. Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., supra note 63.
85. David Crawford & Laura Stevens, European Lenders Keep Ties to Iran, WALL
STREET J. (Sept. 13, 2012, 3:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000087
2396390443696604577644781261934626 [https://perma.cc/2YBW-DX87].
86. Report: Deutsche Bank to Cut Business Ties to Iran, DEUTSCHE WELLE (July 28,
2007), http://www.dw.com/en/report-deutsche-bank-to-cut-business-ties-to-iran/a-2710
190 [https://perma.cc/S9QN-GZN3].
87. Id.
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B. SANCTIONS RUNNING: CORPORATIONS
The Treasury Department has recently adopted a more aggressive
posture in prosecuting sanctions violations against nonfinancial
institutions.88 In March 2017, Chinese technology company ZTE agreed
to pay a $1.2 billion fine to resolve U.S. sanctions on Iran and North
Korea.89 U.S. regulators accused the company of using American-made
equipment to build telecommunication networks in Iran.90 In February
2017, the U.S. found that Taiwan-based B Whale Corporation had run
afoul of the law when a ship received Iranian crude oil in the Pacific
Ocean. 91 OFAC found that the transfer of crude constituted an “‘an
importation from Iran to the United States’ in contravention of the Iranian
Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (‘ITSR’)”.92
In August 2017, the Treasury Department found that Singaporean oil
field-services company COSL Singapore had violated Iran sanctions by
exporting supplies through subsidiaries to rigs operating in Iranian
water.93 COSL agreed to pay a fine of more than $400,000.94 That same
month, U.S. due-diligence firm IPSA International Services Inc. agreed
to pay nearly $260,000 for apparent violations of the ITSR by facilitating
payments to providers of Iranian-origin services.95 Again in August 2017,
American Export Lines and International Shipping Company violated
sanctions law by shipping used and junked cars and parts to Afghanistan

88. Mike Casey et al., Sanctions Compliance Lessons From Recent OFAC Actions,
LAW360 (Sept. 13, 2017, 12:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/963445/
sanctions-compliance-lessons-from-recent-ofac-actions [https://perma.cc/YEE5-VBB5].
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Zachary S. Brez et al., OFAC Hits ExxonMobil with $2 Million Sanctions Penalty
and Public Rebuke, ROPES & GRAY LLP (July 24, 2017), https://www.ropes
gray.com/~/media/Files/alerts/2017/07/20170724_GE_Alert.pdf.
92. Id.
93. Michael O’Kane, OFAC Fines COSL Singapore for Violating US Sanctions
on Iran, EUR. SANCTIONS (Aug. 29, 2017), https://europeansanctions.com/
2017/08/29/ofac-fines-cosl-singapore-for-violating-us-sanctions-on-iran/
[https://perma.cc/8D7W-7RA7].
94. Id.
95. Tyler Cullis, OFAC Settlement Agreement With IPSA Highlights Needs to
Reconsider Licensing Policies, SANCTIONLAW (Aug. 17, 2017), https://sanctionlaw.com/
ofac-settlement-agreement-ipsa-highlights-needs-reconsider-licensing-policies/
[https://perma.cc/MJ2K-U284].
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from the U.S. via Iran on multiple occasions from 2010 to 2012.96 The
company agreed to pay more than a half million dollars to settle the
violations.97
Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross said after the ZTE settlement was
announced that the U.S. government intended to vigorously punish
sanctions violators.98
C. AVENUES FOR BUSINESS
Companies wishing to pursue business with Iranian counterparts,
which is otherwise prohibited under the sanctions regime, can apply for
either a general or specific license to the OFAC. 99 A general license
allows dealings with “a class of persons” while a specific license is geared
toward “a particular person or entity.”100
OFAC rules require companies applying for a license to state the
reason for business and provide details of the proposed deal, including,
information on the individuals and entities involved. 101 OFAC’s
determination process can take weeks, depending on the type of
transaction proposed and whether the deal touches upon other areas of
U.S. law.102 Acquiring a general or specific license is perhaps the most
direct method for a U.S. company to do business with Iran, as U.S.
companies and financial institutions are generally barred from doing
96. Settlement Agreement Between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control and Blue Sky Blue Sea, Inc., Doing Business as American Export
Lines and International Shipping Company (USA), U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Aug. 17,
2017), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/
20170817_33.aspx [https://perma.cc/2XGS-ERC4].
97. Id.
98. Charles Riley, Chinese Firm Fined $1.2 billion for Violating U.S. Sanctions on
Iran, CNN TECH (Mar. 8, 2017, 12:53 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/07/
technology/zte-china-iran-sanctions/index.html [https://perma.cc/297X-SLKY] (“‘We
are putting the world on notice: the games are over,’ Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross
said in a statement. ‘Those who flout our economic sanctions and export control laws
will not go unpunished—they will suffer the harshest of consequences.’”).
99. OFAC FAQs: General Questions, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treas
ury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_general.aspx [https://perma.cc/4R9CXZLH] (last updated Oct. 31, 2017, 2:31 PM).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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business directly with the Islamic Republic or Iranian companies under
the sanctions regime.103 “Many of OFAC’s licensing determinations are
guided by U.S. foreign policy and national security concerns. Numerous
issues often must be coordinated with the U.S. Department of State and
other government agencies, such as the U.S. Department of
Commerce.”104
III. RISKS AND REWARDS
A. CREATING A MATRIX
In light of the history of Iran sanctions and an analysis of the rules
governing the nuclear accord, a company faces a daunting task in
assessing the risks and rewards for a business to enter Iran.105 A company
must balance its goals of creating value, such as capturing market share,
with an understanding of the threats emanating from new ventures.106
Risk-management tools can assess the trade-offs between opportunities
and risks in a way that reflects the degree of risk a company is willing to
assume compared with the value it sees in a proposition. 107 By
categorizing and prioritizing each risk and reward, executives in riskmanagement departments can determine the risk-reward calculus based
on the organization’s risk appetite.108 Companies commonly use a riskreward or risk-rating methodology matrix to determine the opportunity
for a business prospect compared with the risk. 109 Firms must ensure,
103. OFAC FAQs: Iran Sanctions, supra note 14.
104. OFAC FAQs: General Questions, supra note 99.
105. Michael Volkov, The Changes to Iran Sanctions and Compliance Challenges,
VOLKOV L. GROUP LLC: CORRUPTION, CRIME & COMPLIANCE (Jan. 17, 2016),
https://blog.volkovlaw.com/2016/01/changes-iran-sanctions-compliance-challenges/
[https://perma.cc/2TK9-CXD6].
106. Sam Balaji, The Strategic Value of Risk Taking, RISK MGMT. (Sept. 25, 2017,
6:00 AM), http://www.rmmagazine.com/2017/09/25/the-strategic-value-of-risk-taking/
[https://perma.cc/7EDJ-2EDX].
107. Neil Roiter, IT GRC Tools: Control Your Environment, CSO (Mar. 7, 2011, 7:00
AM),
https://www.csoonline.com/article/2127514/compliance/it-grc-tools—controlyour-environment.html [https://perma.cc/U56A-UR98].
108. Definition of ‘Risk Return Trade Off’, ECON. TIMES, https://economictimes.india
times.com/definition/risk-return-trade-off [https://perma.cc/58VG-WAYX] (last visited
Apr. 3, 2018).
109. George S. Day, Is It Real? Can We Win? Is It Worth Doing?: Managing Risk
and Reward in an Innovation Portfolio, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2007, at 110.
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however, that the benefits to the bottom line and any employee incentives
stemming from a particular business project are balanced against an
ethical corporate culture.110
In many instances, not abiding by a rule or regulatory requirement
that prohibits certain business would result in at least a short-term profit,
until the company is caught and fined.111 Jason Waite, international trade
practice leader and partner at Alston & Bird LLP, said a risk-reward
matrix should be created only after a company has determined that the
business deal is allowed under sanctions laws.112 “You can’t do a risk
matrix on something that is clearly illegal. Going through that exercise
would make the consequences even worse,” Mr. Waite said in an
interview.113 “The time to do a risk-reward matrix is after a legal analysis.
You’ve got to get over that hump first.” 114 Once a company has
determined the legality of a business venture, it can assess the other risks
it would face when entering Iran. 115 A disciplined approach allows a
company to categorize and weigh these ancillary risks, Mr. Waite said.116
Companies will look at the potential opportunity, the potential risk
involved, the controls to prevent the risk and the remaining or “residual”
risk.117 Companies may balance the business opportunity against the cost
of implementing controls and determine if the risk is contained and worth
taking. A risk matrix assesses the business opportunity and the risk after
looking at ways to mitigate those risks. If a company can mitigate a risk
down to a lower score, it can compare that figure with the score assigned
to the potential rewards of the business proposition. Risks and rewards
are relative to each business decision, so scores on a matrix will vary
110. Eric Feldman, The 7 Biggest Mistakes Companies Make That Can Erode Their
Ethical Culture and Destroy Their Reputation, ETHIKOS, Jan.–Feb. 2015, at 1.
111. Andrew White, Lessons from Companies That Put Purpose Ahead of Short-Term
Profits, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 9, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/06/lessons-fromcompanies-that-put-purpose-ahead-of-short-term-profits
[https://perma.cc/KC4JKSCP].
112. Telephone Interview with Jason Waite, Partner, Alston & Bird LLP (Mar. 10,
2017).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Inherent and Residual Risk: How Both Scores Drive Enterprise Risk Decisions,
OPTIV (Dec. 15, 2011), https://www.optiv.com/blog/inherent-and-residual-risk-howboth-scores-drive-enterprise-risk-decisions [https://perma.cc/UY7X-R599].
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based on the risk appetite a company determines for the particular
proposition. If, for example, a company sees an opportunity that cannot
be missed, it will be willing to bear greater risks, but only to the extent
that the company feels it can defend its actions to regulators.
Consequently, the risk score of a matrix will likely be higher than it has
been in other business decisions. Additionally, companies seeking to
develop a risk-reward model in the Iran sanctions context should avoid
the “function trap,” which is a tendency to assess risks separately without
evaluating the overall picture that the combined risks present. 118 For
example, risks to a company’s credit, reputation and operations from a
potential business deal in Iran must be evaluated together, even though
the credit monitoring and operational functions may rest in different
departments. “Such organizational silos disperse both information and
responsibility for effective risk management. They inhibit discussion of
how different risks interact.”119
One method to determine the type and extent of risk is through a riskassessment form, which classifies the risk in terms of the probability of
occurrence and impact. 120 The threat of sanctions violations can be
measured against the proposed benefits of any business dealings.121 Riskmanagement models have been applied to a variety of scenarios involving
industrial projects and their exposure to the specific factors stemming
from their environment.122 Decisions and risks associated are categorized
to evaluate the effect of these factors using a risk matrix.123 A “project
manager can take a holistic view of risk at an early stage, quantify such
risks, and then interpret the result for making a judicious decision.”124
118. Robert S. Kaplan & Anette Mikes, Managing Risks: A New Framework, HARV.
BUS. REV., June 2012, at 48.
119. Id.
120. Sidharth Thakur, A Critical Tool for Assessing Project Risk, BRIGHT HUB
PROJECT MGMT. (June 13, 2015), http://www.brighthubpm.com/risk-management/885
66-tool-for-assessing-project-risk/ [https://perma.cc/7P2F-RPTP].
121. Business Risk Matrix, UNITED AGAINST NUCLEAR IRAN: IRAN BUS. RISK,
https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/iran-business-risks [https://perma.cc/SX3AE9EC] (last visited Apr. 3, 2018).
122. Sumit Datta & S.K. Mukherjee, Developing a Risk Management Matrix for
Effective Project Planning—An Empirical Study, 32 PROJECT MGMT J. 45, 45 (2001)
(“Industrial projects by nature are exposed to various factors arising out of their
environment. Decisions and risk associated with them should therefore consider the effect
of these factors.”).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 46.
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Some of the risks inherent to industrial projects are technological risks,
political risks, social risks, and risks associated with the economic
climate. 125 When the authors applied their model to a steel-plant
modernization project in India, “all the executives in the sample felt that
they could have averted many of the failures by rethinking some of their
strategic decisions, had this model been available to them at the project
formulation stage.”126 Companies contemplating doing business with Iran
can borrow from this model and create risk-reward scales based on the
information they have on hand and how they wish to evaluate it.127 Riskmanagement templates range from simple to complex, with the simpler
ones based on a more intuitive approach that allows senior management
easy comparisons of strategic alternatives. 128 In the context of doing
business in Iran, political risk is a broad category that encompasses all the
hazards associated with an Iran-related project failing to get government
approval or being in violation of sanctions rules if the nuclear agreement
is canceled.129 Financial risk is the hit a company would take in case it
needs to cease operations in Iran.130 Reputational risk is any diminution
of a company’s public image if it is associated with doing business in Iran
or paying sanctions-related penalties.131 The categories encompass many
of the risks firms of all types face when entering the Islamic Republic.132
The model’s flexibility is such that additional categories can be added
based on the type of business and the level of specificity that a company
125. Id.
126. Id. at 51.
127. Johannes Alnes, Risk-Reward Optimization: Illustrated with Conditional Valueat-Risk (Spring 2016) (unpublished master’s thesis, University of Oslo),
https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/52735/Johannes-Alnes—thesis.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/DMV4-FEQD].
128. Risk and Reward Analysis, EXPERT PROGRAM MGMT., https://www.expert
programmanagement.com/2011/07/risk-and-reward-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/8R5T998G] (last visited Apr. 3, 2018).
129. Matthew Spivack, What to Know About Doing Business in Iran, HARV. BUS.
REV. (May 5, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/05/what-to-know-about-doing-business-in-iran
[https://perma.cc/D33H-5D75].
130. Iran Sanctions Solution: Are Your Clients Or Counterparties Doing Business
With
Iran?
You
Are
Accountable,
THOMSON
REUTERS
ACCELUS,
https://www.thomsonreuters.com/content/dam/openweb/documents/pdf/governancerisk-compliance/fact-sheet/iran-sanctions-solution.pdf [https://perma.cc/2X7E-HG2Q].
131. Id.
132. Id.

2018]

IRAN SANCTIONS: A COMPLIANCE PERSPECTIVE

523

deems it necessary to present.133 The objective is to provide management
and the board with a thorough assessment of the risk relative to reward.134
A company’s ability to assess risk and opportunity simultaneously allows
it to manage “offensively as an opportunity rather than defensively as a
hazard.”135
Another point to consider in developing a risk matrix is the stage at
which due diligence is being conducted.136 When companies start the due
diligence on an Iran-related project early, they are less likely to encounter
problems further down the line.137 Developing a business plan concurrent
with risk management allows deals to proceed more smoothly because
due diligence issues can be addressed at the outset.138
B. HYPOTHETICAL ASSESSMENTS
Thus, for a company seeking to sell airplanes in Iran as Boeing and
Airbus are currently seeking to do, a risk model could show the highest
level of political risk based on the Trump administration’s reassessment
of the nuclear accord.139 The financial risk would also be deemed high
133. Which is the Best Strategic Option to Pursue? A Risk Reward Analysis Can Help,
FACTUAL DECISIONS, http://www.analysthire.com/strategy/25-which-is-the-best-strat
egic-option-to-pursue-a-risk-reward-analysis-can-help [https://perma.cc/2SRC-HNHB]
(last visited Apr. 3, 2018).
134. Martin Lipton, Risk Management and the Board of Directors, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 28, 2015), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2015/07/28/risk-management-and-the-board-of-directors-3/
[https://perma.cc/6BUR-KQBS].
135. TAMARA BEKEFI ET AL., MANAGING OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS 6 (2008),
http://www.cimaglobal.com/Documents/ImportedDocuments/cid_mag_managing_oppo
rtunities_and_risk_march08.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6W5-9ZPJ] (“The ability to use
tools to simultaneously recognize and assess risk and opportunity can enable a company
to manage offensively as an opportunity rather than defensively as a hazard, which is the
more typical response.”).
136. International Expansion and Global Market Opportunity Assessment, in
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 402 (2012),
http://jsmith.cis.byuh.edu/pdfs/challenges-and-opportunities-in-internationalbusiness.pdf [https://perma.cc/YTH4-7D49].
137. Henry Smith, Iran: Risk and Reward. Could Your Business be a Successful FirstMover?, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a
f189b67-bb88-46ec-8925-f626daef7be0 [https://perma.cc/RWJ9-8CZL].
138. Id.
139. Felicia Schwartz & Ian Talley, Boeing, Airbus Sales Imperiled as Trump
Administration Formulates Iran Plan, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 15, 2017, 4:01 PM),
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for the hypothetical airplane company based on the potential loss of a
contract worth tens of millions of dollars. 140 The reputational risk
stemming from regulatory penalties, on the other hand, could receive the
lowest risk score because of the shifting political stances surrounding Iran
sanctions. The airplane company could argue that it had entered into its
Iran contracts before the nuclear accord was annulled, limiting negative
publicity. The total score would be a seven out of a possible nine,
signifying a medium-risk scenario for the company seeking to sell
airplanes to Iran.
Chart 1: Airplane Manufacturer Risk Score
Risk

Score

Political Risk

3-Highest

Financial Risk

3-Highest

Reputational Risk

1-Lowest

Total

7-Combined Score

When assessing potential benefits of doing business in Iran, broad
categories such as financial gain, market-share advantage, and the effect
to a stock price can be assessed using the same numeric scale, with three
denoting the most favorable outcome. 141 Using the example of the
hypothetical airplane company, the financial gain could be determined by
measuring the potential sales as a fraction of revenue.142 Market-share
https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-airbus-sales-imperiled-as-trump-administrationformulates-iran-plan-1513360961 [https://perma.cc/V5HW-TCBW].
140. Samuel Rubenfeld, U.S. Aviation Exports to Iran Still at Risk from Sanctions,
WALL STREET J. (Mar. 30, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/riskand
compliance/2016/03/30/u-s-aviation-exports-to-iran-still-at-risk-from-sanctions/
[https://perma.cc/942S-PNVG].
141. Matthew Maclachlan, Iran: The New Frontier for Companies Looking to Grow,
COMMUNICAID (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.communicaid.com/cross-culturaltraining/blog/before-doing-business-in-iran/ [https://perma.cc/97ZY-UEUD].
142. JOHN D.W. MORECRAFT, STRATEGIC MODELLING AND BUSINESS DYNAMICS: A
FEEDBACK SYSTEMS APPROACH (2d ed. 2015).
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gains may be calculated as the percentage of the Iranian airplane market
the company is seeking to capture, and the stock price assessment may be
an estimate of the share price rising if airplanes are sold in Iran—provided
the company is publicly traded.143
Chart 2: Airplane Manufacturer Reward Score
Reward

Score

Financial Gain

3-High

Market Share

3-High

Stock Price

2-Medium

Total

8-Combined Score

The rewards scenario presents a favorable score of eight out of a
possible nine, indicating that for the airplane company, the potential gains
of doing business with Iran outweigh the risks based on the specific
factors considered.
C. OIL COMPANY RISK-REWARD MATRIX
A risk-reward matrix can similarly be applied to a hypothetical
foreign oil-and-gas company seeking to explore and develop oil fields in
Iran. French oil-and-gas company Total SA set an example last year when
it signed a deal with Iran to take part in the development of the South Pars
natural gas field.144 Oil exploration and development is typically a yearslong process requiring a large upfront investment before costs can be
recouped. 145 In the context of Iran, an energy company could foresee
heightened political and financial risks that accompany oil exploration
and development. The score likely would be supported by an analysis
143. Id.
144. Stanley Reed, Total Signs Deal With Iran, Exposing It to Big Risks and Rewards,
N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/03/business/energyenvironment/iran-total-france-gas-energy.html [https://perma.cc/3U28-SE9F].
145. IFP SCHOOL: THE GRADUATE SCHOOL FOR ENERGY AND TRANSPORTATION
PROFESSIONS, WHAT ARE THE MAIN STEPS OF AN OIL OR GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT
PROJECT? (2014), http://www.ifp-school.com/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-02/3_
main_steps_oil_gas_field_development.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3E6-NQTR].

526

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXIII

showing greater risk to the company the longer it takes to complete the
project, as political and economic uncertainty increase over time. The oil
company could conceivably seek further nuance in its matrix,
differentiating between political risks emanating from the possible
reimposition of sanctions on Iran and regulatory risks from it failing to
comply with Iranian laws governing the extraction of oil.
Two other risk factors could be added to the matrix—price
fluctuations and industrial hazards—based on a prior study of oil-industry
risks.146 Price fluctuations would take into account the price per barrel of
oil extracted to break even on the project and forecast the likelihood that
world oil prices would remain above that threshold. Industrial hazard
could analyze the history of accidents in similar projects and proposed
safety protocols. The oil company could have the greatest control over
this last risk if it adheres to strict safety protocols.
Chart 3: Oil Company Risk Score
Risk

Score

Political Risk

3-Highest

Regulatory Risk

3-Highest

Financial Risk

3-Highest

Oil Price Risk

2-Medium

Industrial Hazard

1-Lowest

Total

12-Combined Score

On the reward side of the calculus, the hypothetical oil company can
draw a distinction between market share—what percentage of Iranian oil
it stands to export relative to peers—and crude supplies to which it will
have access. A large proportion of oil companies’ research-and-

146. INSTITUTE AND FACULTY OF ACTUARIES, RISK MANAGEMENT CASE STUDY–OIL
GAS INDUSTRY (2016), https://www.actuaries.org.uk/documents/oil-and-gas-casestudy [https://perma.cc/6JTF-G95N].
AND
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development budget is devoted to securing new crude reserves.147 By
entering Iran, the hypothetical foreign oil firm could gain access to a large
supply of easy-to-access oil, potentially diminishing the need to spend on
less promising ventures in other parts of the world. Similarly, the
company could possibly gain a technological edge over rivals if its Iranian
partners share oil-extraction techniques with it.
Chart 4: Oil Company Reward Score
Reward

Score

Financial Gain

2-Medium

Access to Reserves

3-High

Market Share

3-High

Technology

1-Medium

Stock Price

1-Low

Total

10-Combined Score

A simple risk-reward matrix as illustrated above would show that the
risks to the oil company entering Iran outweigh the potential benefits
based on the factors chosen and their relative scores. A risk-reward
matrix can be as simple or complex as the conditions require to aid in the
decision-making process. A similar tool, called a “value-risk option,”
evaluates the trade-off between the value a particular business proposition
holds compared with its attendant risks.148
D. BANK RISK-REWARD MATRIX
A bank considering establishing business relations in the Islamic
Republic or with an Iran-affiliated financial institution could also create
147. EY, DRIVING OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN OIL AND GAS (2015),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-driving-operational-performance-inoil-and-gas/$FILE/ey-driving-operational-performance-in-oil-and-gas.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5DB3-DQSZ].
148. Genebelin Valbuena, Decision Making Process - a Value-Risk Trade-off
Practical Applications in the Oil & Gas Industry, 3 MANAGEMENT 142 (2013).
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a risk-reward matrix to evaluate the overall costs and benefits of the
venture. Global banks conducting business in high-risk areas must
routinely conduct assessments based on a variety of threats to their
business. Financial institutions face the risk of running afoul of U.S. antimoney-laundering and sanctions laws, for instance. A bank seeking links
with an Iranian financial institution could create a matrix weighing these
risks against the proposed opportunities. For example, if the bank’s
compliance department has proposed controls to diminish the risks of
running afoul of sanctions laws, then those residual risks can be evaluated
against the proposed business opportunity. If the bank deems that the
probable occurrence of a violation is lower after it has implemented robust
monitoring mechanisms, then it can assign a lower risk score to such an
event. Alongside operational risks are threats to the hypothetical bank’s
reputation, share price and earnings if it runs afoul of sanctions laws.
Based on these factors, the bank’s executives can create a simple matrix,
but one based on rigorous research and controls.
Chart 5: Bank Risk Score
Iran Sanctions:
Bank Risk Matrix

Score

Regulatory Monitors

3-Highest

Fines and Penalties

3-Highest

Reputational Risk

2-Medium

Share Price Loss

1-Low

Sanctions Reimposed

3-Highest

Total

12-Combined Score

On the reward side of the ledger, the bank can list the opportunities
derived from being one of the few international banks operating in Iran.
The hypothetical bank could, through its non-U.S. subsidiary, finance
deals between international and Iranian companies in Iran’s oil, aviation
and shipping sectors. The opportunities that banking in Iran provide
would be based on the bank’s risk appetite, backed by analysis, and
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balanced by controls that would prevent it from running afoul of sanctions
laws. A simple chart could show the scores for each opportunity.
Chart 6: Bank Reward Score
Iran Sanctions:
Bank Reward Matrix

Score

Market Share

3-Highest

Earnings Contribution

2-Medium

Expertise in Iranian Market

3-Highest

New Clients

3-Highest

Share Price Gain

3-Highest

Total

14-Combined Score

The risk-reward matrix could be as complex as needed to account for
all the factors that the bank deems important to make a determination on
whether to do business in Iran. Each score should reflect the bank’s
overall risk appetite, and risk and reward scores should be comparable. In
other words, the total numerical scores of the risk and rewards should be
the best quantitative estimate possible based on a rigorous analysis of each
factor. Thus, the matrix should be a reader-friendly assessment based on
thorough research, which is included in the overall report. Also included
in the final report should be the controls that compliance officers will help
create to prevent the hypothetical bank from running afoul of sanctions
laws. The following section looks at some of the most common controls
that banks have instituted in the aftermath of sanctions violations of the
recent past.
E. EFFECTIVE CONTROLS FOR BANKS
Compliance professionals are routinely entrusted with the
establishment and implementation of controls after the business has
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conducted a thorough risk assessment and identified major risks. 149
Controls are checks on specific risks and may include business practices,
written policies and procedures, independent verification, background
checks, monitoring, and employee training, among other factors.150 Seen
in the context of Iran sanctions, U.S. regulators already have identified
many of the compliance deficiencies that financial institutions face when
dealing with the Islamic Republic or affiliated organizations. 151
Furthermore, some global banks have sought compliance guidance in the
deferred prosecution agreements or consent orders issued by authorities
when announcing penalties and have enacted controls based on that
guidance.152 Consequently, this section delineates several of the biggest
risks to financial institutions and controls to limit Iran-related risk.
1. Risk: Regulator Scrutiny over ‘Check-the-Box’ Mentality153
Control: Emphasizing Culture of Compliance,
Setting up Iran Hotline
Emphasizing core values is perhaps the most important single step
banks have taken to send a message that they will not tolerate sanctionsdodging or any other violations regardless of the locale or the potential
sums involved. 154 Banks often emphasize their core beliefs through
statements of principles stating they will prioritize “what is right—not just

149. LORI A. BROWN ET AL., COMPLIANCE 101: A GUIDE TO BUILDING EFFECTIVE
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (2008), www.higheredcompliance.org/compliance/resources/
Compliance-101.ppt [https://perma.cc/R9QD-JG8L].
150. Internal Controls, COMPLIANCE WK., https://www.complianceweek.com/
internal-controls#.Whmx_7aZMlU [https://perma.cc/CP7E-3YKJ] (last visited Apr. 3,
2018).
151. Mancuso et al., supra note 76.
152. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, RECENT TRENDS IN CORRESPONDENT
BANKING RELATIONSHIPS—FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS (2017), https://www.imf.org/~/
media/Files/Publications/PP/031617.ashx [https://perma.cc/W4YP-9XM2].
153. See Appendix for chart of business risks and proposed controls.
154. DELOITTE, TONE AT THE TOP: THE FIRST INGREDIENT IN A WORLD-CLASS ETHICS
AND COMPLIANCE PROGRAM (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/
us/Documents/risk/us-aers-tone-at-the-top-sept-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N5S6-SP
DA].

2018]

IRAN SANCTIONS: A COMPLIANCE PERSPECTIVE

531

what is allowed.”155 Compliance officers at banks can stress core values
through periodic updates to the board of directors and meetings with
department heads to gauge the extent to which the core values are being
adhered to in day-to-day business. 156 U.S. regulators have looked
favorably upon the speed and extent of remediation efforts when issues
are brought to light.157 Officials, for example, are looking for a “critical
mindset versus a more passive and box-checking approach.”158
Furthermore, a potential violation or gap in monitoring could
potentially lead to a review of a bank’s other branches and operations.159
Banks have taken an active approach to managing the risk of sanctions
violations by instituting a compliance hotline. 160 The hotline is an
independently monitored, anonymous reporting tool that allows banks to
investigate complaints of possible unethical or illegal activity in the early
stages, before it has come into public view.161 The goal is to institute a
forward-looking policy that aims to root out shortcomings instead of
reacting to media reports or regulators’ inquiries.162

155. Corporate Culture and Corporate Values, Deutsche Bank, https://www.db.com/
cr/en/concrete-cultural-change.htm?kid=werte.inter.redirect
[https://perma.cc/UE32TRR7] (follow “Corporate values” tab) (last visited Apr. 3, 2018).
156. Dianne Pledgie, Striking the Right Balance: The OIG’s New Compliance
Guidance for the Board of Directors, HEALTH CENTER COMPLIANCE (Aug. 6, 2015),
https://www.healthcentercompliance.com/subscriber/compliance-connection/1625
[https://perma.cc/Q29B-ZANJ].
157. Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., DFS Fines Zenefits $1.2 Million for
Repeated Violations of New York Insurance Law (Apr. 11, 2017),
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1704111.htm [https://perma.cc/RP3J-HC6W].
158. The Regulatory and Enforcement Outlook for Financial Institutions in 2017:
Trends in Sanctions, Anti-Money Laundering and Cybersecurity, supra note 30.
159. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Releases Review
of Efforts to Enhance Large Bank Supervision (Dec.13, 2016), https://www.occ.treas.
gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2016/nr-occ-2016-155.html
[https://perma.cc/FWQ3-DAHW].
160. Ethics & Compliance Hotline, KPMG, https://home.kpmg.com/us/en/home/
about/ethics-and-compliance-hotline.html [https://perma.cc/S7SY-MMDE] (last visited
Apr. 3, 2018).
161. Id.
162. DELOITTE, supra note 154.
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2. Risk: U.S. Employees Interact with Iranian Accounts
Control: ‘Ring-Fencing’ Employees, Separating Iran Funds
Treasury Department guidelines emphasize that foreign financial
institutions with U.S. operations may do business with Iran as long as
Americans are not involved in the Iran deals, and that no dollar-based
transactions occur.163 To avoid sanctions violations, compliance officers
should set up separate accounts for any business conducted in Iran, and
establish related policies and procedures prohibiting a co-mingling of
Iran-related money with other funds. Creating clearly marked separate
Iran accounts is a cumbersome but worthy endeavor in light of the
potential liabilities a bank may incur if American bank employees come
into contact with Iranian funds.164 The separation of Iran accounts also
allows the fund transactions to be conducted in euros, not in prohibited
dollars.165 As an additional layer of protection, policies and procedures
regarding the separate accounts can be tested by an independent auditor
periodically, and any shortcomings can be addressed with the greatest
urgency. 166
3. Risk: ‘Wire-Stripping’
Control: Additional Surveillance of Iran Wire Transfers
Financial institutions paid hefty sanctions fines for removing
identifying information contained in wire transfers.167 Banks must ensure
that mechanisms are in place to monitor compliance with regulations
surrounding such transfers. 168 Compliance professionals can become
active participants in business decisions and establish processes to closely
monitor the businesses emails and interactions between a company’s
employees and parties in the Iranian business venture to effectively frontrun an issue, such as wire-stripping, before it occurs. Compliance
departments can also conduct thorough reviews of policies and
procedures around wire transfers to identify where potential gaps in

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

OFAC FAQs: Iran Sanctions, supra note 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., supra note 63.
Id.
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compliance can occur.169 Once those policies and procedures have been
strengthened, banks can establish a monitoring and random-testing
schedule that should uncover any anomalies in the way funds are
transferred in and out of Iran or with Iranian entities.170 More generally,
Robert Cook, president of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority,
an industry body, has pointed to gaps in firms’ money-surveillance
systems as an area that needs special focus.171 “We have seen weaknesses
in systems monitoring foreign currency transactions and transactions that
flow through suspense accounts,” Mr. Cook said in his 2017 Regulatory
and Examination Priorities Letter.172
4. Risk: Sanctions Violations at Correspondent Banks
Control: Strengthening Due Diligence
Treasury Department rules state that “Non-U.S., non-Iranian
financial institutions should have appropriate systems and controls to
ensure that they do not route transactions involving Iran to or through the
U.S. financial systems unless the transactions are exempt from regulation
or authorized by OFAC.”173 To control for this risk, compliance officers
have designated a supervisor or a committee to ascertain the effectiveness
of sanctions and anti-money-laundering programs at the correspondent
banks. 174 Banks must be cognizant of the ownership structure and the
products and services offered at the correspondent banks.175 Furthermore,
they must be satisfied that the controls at the correspondent banks are
effective enough to prevent sanctions violations, and that the affiliate
bank investigates any suspicious activity.176 This step adds an extra layer
169. Id.
170. Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 115-44
(2017).
171. FINRA, 2017 REGULATORY AND EXAMINATION PRIORITIES LETTER (2017),
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2017-regulatory-and-examination-prioritiesletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UXA-SWWG].
172. Id. at 8.
173. Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Lifting of Certain U.S. Sanctions
Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Implementation Day, supra
note 25, § C. 15.
174. The Correspondent Banking Due Diligence Guide, ARACHNYS,
http://info.arachnys.com/correspondent-banking-white-paper-due-diligence-guide
[https://perma.cc/4B7E-NM4R].
175. Id.
176. Id.
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of protection and shows regulators and global clientele that banks are
committed to standards of integrity.177 Regulators expect banks to have
“robust . . . compliance programs that include appropriate customer due
diligence so that the institutions have a clear understanding of . . . risk
profiles and expected account activity.”178 The information is designed to
help U.S. depository institutions make informed decisions regarding the
risks associated with correspondent banks and the level of suspiciousactivity monitoring needed to manage those risks effectively.179
5. Risk: Client Affiliation with Sanctioned Entities
Control: Enhancing Know-Your-Customer Screening
Among the greatest risks of doing business in Iran are the links
between individuals and businesses that may be on a sanctions list.180 For
example, a bank may be permitted to do business with a local Iranian
business, but not if that business is owned or controlled by the IRGC.181
The group is still under U.S. terrorism-related sanctions, and the existence
of such a relationship would put a financial institution in jeopardy of
violating sanctions rules.182 Compliance officers would generally create
and monitor such an internal database of Iranian businesses and
individuals, including politically exposed persons, or PEPs, on U.S.
sanctions lists.183 The database can borrow from the list maintained by the
Treasury Department’s OFAC. 184 Indeed, OFAC has made available a
detailed compliance checklist for identifying and assessing name

177. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 147.
178. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ET AL., U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY AND FEDERAL BANKING AGENCIES JOINT FACT SHEET
ON FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT BANKING: APPROACH TO BSA/AML AND OFAC
SANCTIONS SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT 2 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Documents/Foreign%20Correspondent%20Banking%20Fact%20
Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CGX-7FF8].
179. Id.
180. Paul Renner, Iran–Know Your Customer (KYC) Rules, KYCMAP,
http://kycmap.com/iran-know-your-customer-kyc-rules/
[https://perma.cc/8ZU2-SH
2W] (last visited Apr. 3, 2018).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 152.
184. OFAC FAQs: Iran Sanctions, supra note 14.

2018]

IRAN SANCTIONS: A COMPLIANCE PERSPECTIVE

535

matches. 185 Compliance officers would routinely incorporate the
Treasury Department checklist into a financial institution’s Iran sanctions
policies and procedures. The registry should include a confirmation of the
person’s identity and any aliases, addresses, passport numbers,
professional status, and links to government and organizations. 186
Determining Iranian companies’ links to the IRGC is also a difficult
endeavor due to the lack of transparency in the Iranian market. 187
Compliance officers generally start the due-diligence process by
determining the controlling stakeholders or beneficial owners of an
Iranian corporation, and whether it is listed on any stock exchange.188
Further inquiry could include determining if there are any affiliates
through a search of news reports and by commissioning a private
investigation within Iran.189
6. Risk: Sudden ‘Snap-Back’ of Sanctions, Asset Confiscation
Control: Plan to Wind Down Iran Operations, Contingency Fund
The Trump administration has refused to recertify the Iran deal,
putting it at risk.190 Under heightened tensions with Iran, the U.S. could
categorize any number of acts by Iran as a potential violations to the
agreement.191 For example, tankers carrying Iranian oil turned off their
radars or gave misleading or incomplete information, according to recent
185. OFAC FAQs: Sanctions Compliance, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treas
ury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_compliance.aspx [https://perma.cc/2
2JB-G7GH] (last updated Mar. 19, 2018, 2:06 PM).
186. Enhanced Due Diligence Reports / Detailed KYC Background Checks in Iran,
PROXIMAL CONSULTING, https://www.proximalconsulting.com/iran/ [https://perma.cc/28
75-WVWC] (last visited Apr. 3, 2018).
187. Nicholas Borroz, Beyond Sanctions: Minimizing Beneficial Ownership Risk
in Iran, RISK ASSISTANCE NETWORK & EXCHANGE (Oct. 28, 2015),
https://nicholasborroz.wordpress.com/2015/11/09/beyond-sanctions-minimizingbeneficial-ownership-risk-in-iran/ [https://perma.cc/32BB-K3LH].
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Adam Edelman, Trump Threatens to Cancel Iran Nuclear Deal If It’s Not
Strengthened, NBC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2017, 3:49 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/
donald-trump/trump-puts-iran-nuclear-deal-hands-congress-n810366
[https://perma.cc/VK4B-AHQW].
191. Jay Solomon & Carol E. Lee, White House Intervened to Toughen Letter on Iran
Nuclear Deal, WALL STREET J., (April 25, 2017, 7:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/white-house-intervened-to-toughen-letter-on-iran-nuclear-deal-1493151632
[https://perma.cc/3P5V-NHS9].
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reports.192 As the flash points between the U.S. and Iran rise, so do the
risks that the nuclear deal will collapse.193 Banks must weigh the risk that
Iran-related operations would be violating U.S. laws if sanctions are
“snapped back” or reimposed.194 The Treasury Department’s OFAC has
indicated that companies would be allowed a wind-down period to exit
Iran-related business dealings, and that this period could be around 180
days.195
To mitigate the risk of a business disruption, a bank can employ an
unconventional protective measure: devising a “living will” to dispose of
Iran assets and wind down Iran operations in case sanctions are
reimposed. Living wills are plans that banks provide U.S. regulators on
how they would wind down operations in an orderly fashion in the event
of a severe crisis.196 Creating a living will for Iran operations would allow
compliance officers to designate supervisors responsible for creating and
possibly implementing a plan to exit the country. Such contingency
planning could include contractual provisions about liability, claims, and
asset sales when entering into agreements with Iranian counterparties.
Asset confiscation looms as a related threat to any business a bank
conducts in Iran or with Iranian assets.197 Seizure of property or funds can
occur anywhere in the world, as a recent judgment against an Iranianowned building in New York demonstrates. 198 In such a volatile
environment, a bank must have a contingency fund as well as appropriate
192. Sarah McFarlane & Benoit Faucon, Ships Exporting Iranian Oil Go Dark,
Raising Sanctions Red Flags, WALL STREET J. (July 6, 2017, 7:46 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ships-exporting-iranian-oil-go-dark-raising-sanctions-redflags-1499333402 [https://perma.cc/ML5F-KT7Z].
193. Carol Morello, Iran Nuclear Deal Could Collapse Under Trump, WASH. POST
(Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran-nucleardeal-could-collapse-under-trump/2016/11/09/f2d2bd02-a68c-11e6-ba59-a7d93165c6d4
_story.html?utm_term=.4cf2828203f5 [https://perma.cc/DU8H-7X29].
194. Hill et al., supra note 29.
195. Id.
196. Reuters, Wells Fargo Faces Sanctions After Failing ‘Living Wills’ Test,
FORTUNE (Dec. 13, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/12/13/wells-fargo-living-wills-test/
[https://perma.cc/4CUX-BKH9].
197. Keiko Morris, U.S. Government Wins Right to Seize Iranian-Owned Tower in
Manhattan, WALL STREET J. (June 29, 2017, 6:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/us-government-wins-right-to-seize-iranian-owned-tower-in-manhattan-1498776556
[https://perma.cc/LG7E-6KMG].
198. Id.
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insurance to protect itself against haphazard events.199 In their advisory
role, compliance officers can recommend that senior management set
aside certain sums from the revenue generated by Iranian business. The
amount of any contingency fund should be based on a risk assessment of
the various businesses that could be in danger of forfeiture, and the
amount could fluctuate over time as the risk rises or dips.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has approached the issue of Iran sanctions by presenting
the legal and regulatory challenges that the law presents for businesses,
not least of all the sanctions’ complexity and ever-shifting nature. It has
argued that despite such complexity, compliance officers have the means
to assess the risks and rewards of business prospects with a sanctioned
country such as Iran. This Essay has presented the history of Iran
sanctions laws and their current implementation, allowing compliance
officers to develop a firm grounding in the legal and regulatory
environment. It has listed sanctions violations by banks as well as
corporations, showing the range of violations and effective controls to
mitigate risks. Furthermore, this Essay has proposed the creation of a
risk-reward matrix as a tool to holistically evaluate the overall business
opportunities relative to the risks of any Iran business dealings across a
variety of industries.

199. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., RMS MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES § 6.1
(2015), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section6-1.pdf [https://perma.
cc/FW2M-4Y4H].
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APPENDIX
IRAN BUSINESS RISK-CONTROL CHART
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